Operation Gelb,
the invasion of France (and Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg)
began on Friday, 10th of May
1940. During World War 2 it was believed that for the campaign in Western
Europe in 1940 the Germans had overwhelming strength facing the Allies,
as well as a united decisive leadership which followed a plan worked out
to the last detail. Post war research has shown that these assumptions
were incorrect, for the German Army was numerically inferior to it's enemies,
it's Panzer force as a whole was under gunned with less armour protection
while it's leadership was torn by doubts and fears about unprotected flanks
and it's plans were a compromise of conflicting schools of thought.
The victory which the Germans achieved in fact wasn't
from numbers of vehicles or in the quality of the panzer arm; rather it
was the handling of armour by competent and aggressive commanders at corps
and division level; particularly by Guderian and Rommel, who saw that the
key to success lay in the application of Schlieffen's dictum, 'In movement
lies victory'. During the 1940 campaign the Germans overcame the various
inferiority's they had by using mobility as a psychological weapon; it
was movement above gunfire that brought success. Thrust deep into the Allied
front paralyzed the mind of the French and left them shocked by the tempo
of the advance or else compelled them to order a retreat. Once this happened,
the force of successive German trust allowed the Allies no time to form
a front but instead quickly brought them to a point where they had been
split and could be destroyed piecemeal.
Allied strategy put great confidence in fortifications
and was, therefore, defensive, whereas the Germans thought in terms of
offense and dictated the area and the pace of the offensive. They were
also confident of victory and this, together with the excellence of their
tanks and the practice which their commanders had had in handling armour
in mass, produced the conditions which enabled them to fight and win a
lightning campaign. Those lightning campaigns of 1939, 40 and even 41 and
42 were not wars of material in which the numbers and quality of equipment
were the deciding factors, but wars of speed and maneuver in which organization
and tactics played the major part. In these the Germans were unrivaled,
their tanks, out-dated though the majority were, proving quite adequate
for their task. Three basic principles govern tank design-fire power, protection
and mobility. The latter being the Germans dominating advantage.
However, as the war progressed into defensive engagements
and a slugging match with heavily armed and armoured Russian tanks, armour
thickness and fire-power became the priority. The Panther and Tiger tanks
were more than ready for the task. With thick armour and high muzzle velocity
they rightly have been viewed the best tanks of the war. Considering all
of the Panzer arm most of their engagements were against superior numbers
on either front, and at times miss used as a result of Hitler's ever growing
meddling and self-destructive ego to deny a strategic retreat in the face
of encirclement or improper deployment less suited for their design, led
to slaughter and waste numerous times. Despite the misuse, their military
accomplishments makes one wonder what could have been if Hitler had trusted
more in his Generals.
By the time of the Normandy invasion, June 6, 1944, the
most dangerous enemy to the Armour of the Reich
was Allied air power. Certainly on the Western front. |
